Bump github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.11 to 2.0.18

[dependabot]

Bumps github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.11 to 2.0.18.

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's releases.

v2.0.18

v2.0.18 03 Dec 2023
[Security Fixes]
  * [jwe] A large number in p2c parameter for PBKDF2 based encryptions could cause a DoS attack,
    similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36083.  All users who use JWE via this
    package should upgrade. While the JOSE spec allows for encryption using JWE on JWTs, users of
    the `jwt` package are not immediately susceptible unless they explicitly try to decrypt
    JWTs -- by default the `jwt` package verifies signatures, but does not decrypt messages.
    [GHSA-7f9x-gw85-8grf]

v2.0.17

v2.0.17 20 Nov 2023
[Bug Fixes]
  * [jws] Previously, `jws.UnregisterSigner` did not remove the previous signer instance when
    the signer was registered and unregistered multiple times ([#1016](https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/issues/1016)). This has been fixed.
[New Features]

[jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) jwe.WithCEK has been added to extract the content encryption key (CEK) from the Decrypt operation.
[jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) jwe.EncryptStatic has been added to encrypt content using a static CEK.
Using static CEKs has serious security implications, and you should not use
this unless you completely understand the risks involved.

v2.0.16

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023
[Security]
  * [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature
    is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before
    had been removed in [#65](https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/issues/65), resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass
    verification.
One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer,
both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.
Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

Wrong   = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes)     S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)
In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes

populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor

may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the

first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R,

and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to

fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit

allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.



[jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data
</tr></table>

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's changelog.

v2.0.18 03 Dec 2023 [Security Fixes]

• [jwe] A large number in p2c parameter for PBKDF2 based encryptions could cause a DoS attack, similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36083. All users who use JWE via this package should upgrade. While the JOSE spec allows for encryption using JWE on JWTs, users of the jwt package are not immediately susceptible unless they explicitly try to decrypt JWTs -- by default the jwt package verifies signatures, but does not decrypt messages. [GHSA-7f9x-gw85-8grf]

v2.0.17 20 Nov 2023 [Bug Fixes]

• [jws] Previously, jws.UnregisterSigner did not remove the previous signer instance when the signer was registered and unregistered multiple times (#1016). This has been fixed.

[New Features]

• [jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) jwe.WithCEK has been added to extract the content encryption key (CEK) from the Decrypt operation.
• [jwe] (EXPERIMENTAL) jwe.EncryptStatic has been added to encrypt content using a static CEK. Using static CEKs has serious security implications, and you should not use this unless you completely understand the risks involved.

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023 [Security]

• [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before had been removed in #65, resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass verification.

  One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer, both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.

  Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes) Wrong = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

  In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R, and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.

• [jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If Validate() is successful, it only means that the keys are in the right format, including the presence of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.

[New Features]

• [jws] Added jws.WithValidateKey() to force calling key.Validate() before signing or verification.

... (truncated)

Commits

• e75b7c8 v2.0.18 (#1022)
• c02af3e v2.0.17 (#1019)
• 3e23a27 Merge branch 'develop/v2' into v2
• 1f04380 Update Changes
• 16acb8b Fix ParseInsecure to parse the token even when a key is given (#1008)
• 2ee2c13 Slightly tweak docs (#1010)
• d93668b fix typo (#1009)
• 1e3b478 Add (jwk.Key).Validate (#1005)
• 1ecc78f [jws] check signature length (#1004)
• 8074e35 merge for v2.0.15 (#998)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[dependabot]

Superseded by #391.